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I. INTRODUCTION 
Is tort law, as claimed in a recent Vanderbilt Law Review article by Professor 
John C.P. Goldberg, "unloved"?1 Is it true that "notwithstanding its continued 
presence in the frrst-year curriculum, tort is a dep.artment.ofthe law that has fewer 
serious champions than any comparable subdiscipline"?2 In a breathtaking spate 
of recent writings, Professor Goldberg has sought to re-energize tort law and to spur 
twenty-first century tort scholars to return to respe·cting and hopefully loving this 
fottnerly venerated body of the law.3 In his 2002 essay Unloved: Tort in the 
• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B~S., University of Pennsylvania 
(Wharton School), 1973;J.D.,Comell University, 1977. MythanksgotoJolmC.P. Goldberg, Vincent 
R. Johnson, Robert Rabin, and Piene Schlag for helpful comments regarding an earlier draft of this 
article. As always, I am indebted to my J.D.·Ph.D. in English literature spouse, Teresa Faherty 
Blomquist, for her loving and insightful comments. · 
I. John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, SS VANO.L. REv. 1501, 
1503 (2002). . 
2. /d. at I 502. 
3. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Tort, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 21 
(Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (focusing on the conception of tort law as accident and 
regulatory law in twentieth century scholarship); Goldberg, supra note 1 (asserting that tort law 
deserves a rebirth as a loveable and embraceable field of legal theory); John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-
Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L .. J. 513 (2003) (outlining the five lllost prominent approaches to tort 
law in the twentieth century and suggesting measures to improve academic discourse in this area). 
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Modern Legal Academy, he eloquently described how academic lawyers of yore, 
like William Blackstone, embraced tort law "as a small piece of what he took to be 
the gorgeous mosaic of the liberal state's complex system of law."4 Goldberg 
elaborated: 
Just as the structure of English goverrunent King, Parliament, 
and conunon law helped protect rights against official y, 
so [Blackstone loved] tort [for] defm[ing] and defend[ing] the 
right not to be battered, detained, defamed, dispossessed or 
otherwise injured by others. Tort therefore helped fulfill the 
social contract. Upon entering civilized society, individuals give 
up their natural right to wreak vengeance on their wrongdoers in 
exchange for the positive legal power to invoke the apparatus of 
the state to obtain legal redress from thern.5 
After Blackstone's love affair with torts in the eighteenth century, the youthful 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had what Goldberg suggested was a dalliance with tort 
law during the second half of the nineteenth century.6 "Holmes was the frrst 
modem theorist of tort. As such, he presided over its reorientation around the tort 
of negligence, as well as its corresponding elevation to the status of a major 
department of the law."7 With some wry jocularity, Professor Goldberg 
acknowledged that while "it is a bit of a stretch to describe Holmes as a lover of 
iort, fot he seems not to have been a lover of anything or anyone," Holmes 
"mustered at least as much affection for tort as for anything else in his life."8 
According to Goldberg, with the advent of the twentieth century, tort gained 
two more intellectual suitors in Francis Bohlen and Benjamin Cardozo. 9 "Both men 
devoted themselves to recrafting the conunon law of tort to better fit the new age 
of industrial and motorized vehicle accidents."10 Indeed, Cardozo "saw in the 
concepts and byways of the conunon law all the resources necessary to adapt 
• 
Goldberg and bis co-authors imply in the preface to their casebook that tort law is venerable because 
it is so rich and adaptable: 
This book adopts a perspective on (tort] law that we hope is refreshing. It is, of 
course, vital that first-year law students come to appreciate that "the law, is not 
a rule book that there is play in its joints and deep tensions in its soul. Yet it is 
equally important that studentS not be left with the skeptical lesson that (tort) law 
is nothing more than what a particular judge or jury says it is. Thus, in these 
materials, we strive to help students grasp how the key concepts of tort concepts 
such as "reasonable care," "causation," and "intentt' structure and organize 
legal analysis even as they point it in new directions. A good lawyer, we hope to 
demonstrate, is one who appreciates both the limits and the flexibility of tort 
doctrine; one who has a sense of how to make innovative and progressive 
arguments from within the law. 
John C.P. Goldberg et at., Preface to TORT LAW: RESPONSIBIUTIES AND REDRESS XX (2004). 
4. Goldberg, supra note 1, at l 504. 
5. /d. at 1504 05. 
6. See id. at 1 505-06. 
7. !d. 
' 8. /d. at 1506 (citing GRANT GilMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-49 (1977)). 
9. See id. · 
1 0. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1506 (citing George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: 
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 
465-68 (1985))! . 
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Blackstone's law of private redress to the wrongs perpetrated by railroad owners, 
automobile drivers, and product manufacturers."11 
But, as explained by Professor Goldberg, tort law began to encounter ridicule 
and disrespect a few decades into the twentieth century. 12 Tort scholars like 
Fleming James and Albert Ehrenzweig "explicitly condemned tort" for its slowness 
in according relief to accident victims and for its arbitrariness in deciding cases. 13 
According to Goldberg, later scholars such as Mark Franklin and Jeffrey O'Connell 
picked up this line of explicit dirision toward tort. 14 Moreover, another group of 
twentieth century tort scholars, led by Leon Green and William Prosser, exploited 
tort law for the power and influence it could provide "armchair policymakers (law 
professors )."15 As Goldberg described it, these tort gold-diggers did not "love[] tort 
law f~r. w~at it is," but for ~ts "bl~ c~eck" Rropensio/ "to confer jurisdiction" ~d 
to legttmuze "de novo 'soctal engmeenng. "' 6 A promment contemporary explotter 
of tort law, in Goldberg's view, is Judge Richard A. Posner.17 Contrasting Posner's 
conservative exploitation of tort with the ideas of those whom he views as 
contemporary liberal exploiters of tort, like Professors Thomas H. Koenig and 
Michael. .L. Rustad, Goldberg opined as follows: 
If, for Koenig and Rustad, the great thing about tort is that it 
pennits judges and juries to adopt the role of unappointed 
corporate ombudsmen, for Posner the greatthing about tort is that 
it pennits judges to act as roving efficiency commissioners 
charged with the task of identifying and achieving the cost-
efficient mix of precaution and injury.18 · 
Professor Goldberg perceived other modern tort scholars like Richard Epstein 
and Jules Coleman as unlovers of tort, at worst, and cool, detached proponents of 
tort law, at best both refusing to embrace tort law for what it is instead of what it 
might become, as refashioned to meet their own idiosyncratic philosophical 
critiques.19 And, even Professor Ernest J. Weinrib, in Goldberg's view, while 
ll. /d. (citingJohnC.P. Goldberg, TheLifeoftheLaw, 51 STAN.L.REv. 1419, 1455-74(1999)). 
12. See id. at 1509-13. 
. . . 
13. /d. at 1509 (citing Priest, supra note 10, at 470-83). 
14. /d. 
15. /d. at 1510. 
16. Goldberg, supra note I, at 1510-11 (quotingWILUAML.PROSSER,HANDBOOKOFTHELAW 
OF TORTS§ 3, at 15 (1st ed. 1941)). 
17. /d. at 1512. 
18. /d. (footnote omitted). Goldberg's discussion of Koenig and Rustad focuses on their book: 
Th:OMAS H. KOENIG& MICHAELL. RUST AD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (200 l ). According to Goldberg, 
in reference to this book, "(p ]erhaps a better title would have been The Political Usefulness of Tort 
Law., Goldberg, supra note I, at 15 II n.41. In reference to Posner, Goldberg asserts that efficiency 
as a primary Posnerian focus is "the clear implication of Posner's rejection of the idea that law and 
moral principles constrain adjudication,. his corresponding overt embrace of open--ended, policy-based 
judicial decisionmaking, and his belief that aggregate efficiency is, at a minimum, the prime policy 
consideration to which he ... attends and should attend." /d. at 1512 n.45. For this author's view that 
. . 
Judge Posner's judicial opinions (including some tort opinions) express a more nuanced, multi-faceted 
judicial philosophy than mere efficiency and wealth-maximization, see Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, 
Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner·s First Decade of Dissenting Opinions. 198J .. J991 Toward 
an Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 Mo. L. REv. 73 (2004) or Robert F. Blomquist, Playing 
on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner's Appellate Opinions, 1981-82 Ruminations on Sexy Judicial 
Opinion Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 651 (2000). 
19. See Goldberg, supra note 1 , at 1513-1 5. 
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saying that tort law is "'just like love, "'20 does not truly love tort law; if Weinrib 
was a true lover of tort, he would have higher aspirations for his beloved instead of 
being resigned, as Goldberg seemed to see W einrib, to fatalistically accepting the 
content of modem tort law as an ingrained and unmalleable part of the human 
practice and heritage of corrective justice.21 
Professor Goldberg trun1peted a call for those with a deep love for tort law-·---for 
its content and for its power; for its substance as well as its fonn to offer up their 
affection and future aspiration for tort. Although his call is magnetic, this Article 
quibbles with both his critique of W einrib and his aspirational insistence on 
doctrinal coherence for tort. In speaking up for tort law, on one level, this Article 
sounds a bit schmaltzy like Ricky Ricardo, striking up his band to play the theme 
song for the 1950s TV program, I Love Lucy. Yet, on another level, Goldberg's 
article creates an irresistible challenge accepted in this Article the product of a 
torts professor of eighteen years and a sometimes practitioner in the field to pick 
up the gauntlet and join hi1n in an effort to defend and tore-enchant this beloved 
subject. 
*** 
The lusty mo·nth of May! I sit grading bluebooks in my Bahama blue-colored 
study in my Fnmk Lloyd Wright- inspired 1915 condominium building in Oak Park, 
Illinois, which I share with my wife. During moments like these (mostly 
dispiriting), I often think I might be inclined to agree with the dismal assessment 
made by the unlovers of tort identified by Professor Goldberg. Too many of my 
students tend to throw in eve · g-but-the-kitchen-sink-type arguments while 
groping their way through their fmal torts examinations. When I read these 
bluebooks, I wonder whether tort law really might be -as incoherent and unlovable 
as some of the tort unlovers claim, either explicitly or implicitly. But occasionally, 
I come upon a bluebook that identifies nuanced issues in the problems presented; 
delineates key tort concepts, doctrines and principles that might help resolve the 
issues; and boldly concludes its analysis with specific advice for a client or 
arguments for a court. The latter, of course, merits the A in the course (and even the 
course honors) since they portray the law of torts as modestly intelligible, socially 
useful, and worthy of our affection. 
*** 
The goal in this Article is to spark there-enchantment of tort for the twenty-frrst 
century. Part II consists of a short but wide ranging discussion of a philosophical 
model of love for tort law. As part of this rumination, this Article attempts to 
diagnose the general cause for the tort unlovers' malaise, identified by Professor 
Goldberg, as frrst being rooted in a misunderstanding of Ernest Weinrib's 
conception of tort law as non-functional, private law. Thus, on this point, Professor 
Goldberg might harbor a mild disapproval for the structure of tort law which, 
hopefully, he will overcome. Then, to help tort unlovers better appreciate the 
intrinsic attractiveness of tort, Part III delves into the robust aesthetics, both 
functionalist and non-functionalist, of modem tort law. Finally, the goal in Part IV 
is to explain why modem tort law is aesthetically worthy of being loved, even 
though it has disappointed many scholars in certain respects. 
20. ld. at 1501 (quoting ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THEIDEAOFPRIVATELAW 6 (1995)). 
21. /d. at 1515-17. 
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II. A STARTING POINT FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF LoVE FOR TORT LAW 
A. On the General Nature of Love and Disappointed Love for Tort Law 
The object of the emotion love is a beloved. While humans are accustomed to 
thinking of other persons as the potential objects of their love attractive by virtue 
of qualities such as beauty and goodness humans also come to love, or not to love, 
non-human objects.. Thus, humans regularly consider loving concrete objects: for 
example, a girl named Teresa, a guy named Jack, a sculpture by Picasso, a new 
Ferrari, or a · rose garden. But more rarely do humans consider loving abstract 
objects: freedom, democracy, or education, for example. 
As philosopher Sam Keen expressed in his book To Love and Be Loved, 
"[ c ]lassical philosophers and theologians . . . insisted that love can thrive only in 
combination with other virtues."22 "For the Buddha, compassion was necessarily 
linked to wisdom. For Saint Paul, the trinity was faith, hope, and love. For Paul 
Tillich, love, power, and justice stand or fall together."23 Indeed, "[m]ost 
premodern theories consider love to be an elixir that gradually dissolves the 
boundaries we erect between the self and others and progressively drives the ego 
beyond individualism, beyond the sanctuary of intimacy, into a more and more 
inclusive conununity."24 On one hand, according to Keen, all "unhappy love 
stories"-those involving disappointment and disillusionment "are all the same."25 
All unhappy love stories "exhibit the same endlessly repeated, boring pattern of 
resentment, bickering, withholding, blame, disrespect, inattention, abuse, and so 
on."26 On the other hand, happy love stories "are all creative and unique"27 and 
"[ w ]hen we love, we live in a reenchanted world that is governed more by what may 
yet happen than by what ·has already happened, by possibilities that lie beyond our 
wildest imagination. "28 
Professor Goldberg has performed a grea.t service by describing how various 
tort scholars of recent decades are really tellers of an unhappy love story about tort 
law because tort law has disappointed them in its substantive payoff.. As Goldberg 
indicated, these unlovers apparently resent tort because of its often ad hoc, ~9 policy-
driven ways30 of resolving disputes that sometimes "smack too much of crude 
vengeance"31 and its tort stories32 that are "too grim [and] too preposterous."33 
More specifically, Goldberg explained that many tort scholars are jilted lovers of 
tort who do not want to embrace modem tort law because, for them, it has "become 
awkward for at least three reasons":34 (1) "we have asked too much of it";35 (2) 
• 
22. SAM KEEN, To LOVE AND BE LoVED 15 (1997). 
23. Jd. 
24. Jd. 
25. Id. at 17. 
26. Jd. 
27. /d. 
28. KEEN, supra note 22, at 217. 
29. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1518 n.63 (observing that "while the tort system can serve to 
provide sporadic advances toward distributive justice, this sort of'ad hoc-ery' generates hostility not 
only to tort (hence modetn tort refotm), but to the perceived beneficiaries of the system, i.e., the persons 
who stand to benefit from a more above-the-board system of redistribution"). 
30. See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text. 
31. Goldberg, supra note l, at IS 1 7. 
32. See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text. 
33. Goldberg, supra note 1, at IS 18. 
34. Jd. 
35. /d. 
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"modem academics have tended to gauge tort on a set of rigged criteria";36 and (3) 
tort scholars "have sucked much of the law out of tort, leaving institutional actors, 
partic~laz:~r)udges, with a diminished sense of professional self when confronting 
tort suits. 
In my attempt to amplify and build on Professor Goldberg's optimistic 
manifesto of love for tort law, I contend that many scholarly unlovers of tort fail to 
see the potential in modem tort law for are-enchanted law of torts because they are 
locked into the discourse of telling an unhappy love story replete with blame, 
disrespect, withholding, and abuse and because they fail to appreciate the essential 
goodness, resilience, adaptabilitY and beauty of modem tort doctrine. 38 For similar 
reasons, I contend that unlovers of tort law fail to see the trajectory of modem tort 
law and its promising future evolutionary possibilities.39 
B. What Ernest Weinrib Really Meant 
Professor Goldberg cited Professor Ernest W einrib for the proposition that 
private law which includes contract, restitution, property, and tort is '"just like 
love. '"40 According to Goldberg, what Weinrib meant by this cryptic comparison 
is that "tort law is like love in that it cannot be understood by reference to its 
purpose or function" and thus cannot be made intelligible by reference to "the social 
functions it happens to perfor1n."41 Goldberg claimed that "tort to Weinrib 
resembles sport. The sports fan appreciates how the rules, practices, and 
participants in a game like baseball or basketball come together to create a 
distinctive enterprise," but the sports fan, like the lover, according to Goldberg, 
"does not ask what is the point or purpose of the sport."42 
Recall Professor Weinrib's seminal 1995 book,43 ul!on which Professor 
Goldberg relied to describe Weinrib as an unlover of tort. How did Professor 
Weinrib really describe tort law? How did W einrib compare tort law to love? What 
did Goldberg leave out of his description ofW einrib 's analysis of tort law as a type 
of private law? 
1. The Importance of Tort Law 
Professor Goldberg failed to mention Professor Weinrib's view on the 
importance of tort law as a key component along with property law, contract law, 
and the law of restitution in what he tenns "private law."45 On the frrst page of 
his book, Weinrib extolled the importance of private law as "a pervasive 
phenomenon of our social life, a silent but ubiquitous participant in our most 
common transactions":46 
36. !d. 
37. /d. 
3 8. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text. 
40. Goldberg, supra note l, at 1501 (quoting ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 6 
(1995)). 
41. /d. at 1502. 
42. /d. 
43. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IbEAOF PRIVATE LAW (1995). 
44. See generally Goldberg, supra note l, at 1502 (discussing how W einreib, by stating "that tort 
is just like love," actually detnonstrates that tort is unloved). 
45. See WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 1. 
46. /d. 
2005] 
[Private law] is the public repository of our most deeply 
embedded intuitions about justice and personal responsibility. 
Private law is also among the frrst subjects that prospective 
lawyers study. Its position in law school curricula indicates the 
consensus of law teachers that private law is the most elementary 
manifestation oflaw, its reasoning paradigmatic oflegal thinking, 
and i~ c'?nc~ts presupposed in more complex fonns of legal 
organtzatton. 
487 
Based on this thesis, then, Weinrib would not be inclined as GoldberR 
contended he would to equate ''love'' of sport with love of a beloved inamorato. · 
Tort law for Weinrib is different in kind from mere sport; to hint tort law is, like a 
romantic lover, of the highest importance worthy of total cununitment 
2. The Non-Functional Aesthetic Value of Tort Law 
Professor Goldberg did not give enough attention to Professor Weinrib's 
contrarian, non-functionalist view of tort law as a component of private law. While 
Goldberg alluded to Weinrib 's "idea of the internal intelligibility"49 of tozt law as 
a species of private law, so Goldberg's explanation oversimplifies the nuanced points 
that W einrib made about the intrinsic aesthetic beauty of private law in general, and 
tort law in particular. Moreover, W einrib 's account is richer than Goldberg implied. 
Based on Weinrib 's view, tort law (along with property law, unjust enrichment law, 
and contract law) is worthy of love because, as private law, it: (a) is "an autonomous 
body of leaming,"51 {b) is distinct from politics, 52 ( c consists of key concepts that 
from the realm of public law.54 Weinrib explained this idea more fully: 
In asserting that the sole purpose of private law is to be 
private law, I aim to undenttine [functionalist] assumptions. 
I ... argue that private law construes the litigating parties as 
irnmediately connected to each other. Interaction so conceived is 
categorically distinct from that of public law, which relates 
persons only indirectlythrough the collective goals detennined by 
state authority. The different mechanisms for enunciating legal 
norms adjudication and legislation-broadly reflect the different 
contours of these two modes of interaction. The autonomy· of 
private law as a body of learning is a consequence of the 
distinctiveness of private law as a mode of interaction. To 
understand private law, we must take seriously its fundamental 
concepts, which, far from being surrogates for the operation of 
independently justifiable collective purposes, are the juridical 
markers of the inunediate cormection between the parties .. 
47. /d. 
48. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
49. WEINRIB~ supra note 43., at 6. 
SO. Goldberg, supra note l, at 1502 ..  
51. WEINRIB, supra note 43., at 6. 
52. Id. at7. 
53. /d. 
54. Jd. 
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Understood in this way, private law is a juridical, not a political, 
phenomenon. By thus jettisoning the functionalist assumptions 
we can return to the idea that private law is to be understood from 
"thin ss Wl • 
Moreover, Professor Weinrib's account of tort law as a critical component of 
private law6 -under-appreciated in Professor Goldberg's synopsis focuses on tort 
law's aesthetic attractiveness and three-part, mutually-reinforcin~ internal 
coherence: (a) the "immanently intelligible" theoretical fratnework, 7 (b) the 
"Aristotle[ an] conception of corrective justice as the unifying structure that renders 
private law relationships immanently intelligible,"58 and (c) the "nonnative force" 
of the corrective justice paradigm. 59 
3. The Praiseworthy Bipolarity of Tort Law's Proper Focus on 
Corrective Justice 
Professor Goldberg misunderstood Professor Weinrib 's discussion of corrective 
justice in tort law as a tribal "fidelity to 'our' tort law" that is "powerful, almost 
55. /d. at 8. 
56. Weinrib placed particular entphasis on ''the treatment of accidental injuries in the common 
law of torts," in explicating his theory of private law. /d. at 20. Weinrib did this 'f[b ]ecause the 
negligent defendant's culpability seems morally detachable from the fortuity of injury, liability for 
negligence poses a particularly severe challenge to the stringent notion of coherence" he claimed exists 
in private Jaw. WEINRIB, supro note 43, at 20. Accordingly, Weinrib argued that "[i]f fonnalisrn 
illuminates negligence law, it presumably illuminates less problematic bases of liability as well,, id., 
such as liability for breach of contract or unjust enrichment. 
/d. 
51. /d. at 18. Weinrib fully described the theoretical framework: 
The first thesis concerns the theoretical framework. An internal account of 
private law sets in opposition to contemporary functionalism the thesis that 
private law is immanently intelligible. Building on the jurist's understanding of 
private law as a distinctive and coherent ensemble of characteristic features, the 
thesis integrates the distinctiveness, the coherence, and the character of private 
law into a single theoretical approach. Underlying this integration is the notion 
that one understands a legal relationship through its unifying structure, or "fom1." 
Applied to private law, the thesis of immanent intelligibility is a version of legal 
formalism. 
58. Id. at 19. Weinrib contended that his second thesis "identifies Aristotle's conception of 
corrective justice as the unifying structure that renders private law relationships inunanently 
intelligible": 
Corrective justice is the pattern of justificatory coherence latent in the bipolar 
private law relationship ofplaintiffto defendant. By abstractly schematizing this 
pattern, Aristotle made manifest the distinctive rationality of private Jaw. And by 
decisively distinguishing corrective from distributive justice, Aristotle established 
/d. 
!d. 
the categorical difference between private law and other legal orderings. 
59. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at t 9. Weinrib described his third thesis: 
The third thesis concerns the nonnati veness of corrective justice. Corrective 
justice is the justificatory structure that pertains to the immediate intetaction of 
one free being with another. Its nonnative force derives from Kant's concept of 
right as the governing idea for relationships between free beings. For Kant, 
freedom itself implies juridical obligation. On this view, the doctrines, concepts, 
and institutions of private law are nonnative inasmuch as they make a legal 
reality out of relations of corrective justice. 
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moving," but ''is not love precisely because of its fatalistic undertones. "60 Goldberg 
was mistaken when he argued the following: 
Weinrib says that we must attend to correctivejustice because we 
are who we are.; we can do no other. In so saying, he fails to 
capture the ineliminable aspirational aspect of love. One cannot 
love something that one does not respect, admire, or embrace,. at 
least a little bit. A person or thing must contain at least a shadow 
or flickering of the good before· it can become the object of our 
affection. It is not enough that he, she, or it is simply ours.61 
As explained above, W einrib admired and embraced the internal coherence of 
tort law as an aspect of private law.62 The focal point ofWeinrib's enthusiastic 
love for tort law is tort law's doctrinal requirement for a bipolar linking ofthe tort 
claimant with the tort defendant, as exemplified by negligence law, to "consider the 
entitlement of this particular plaintiff to reparation from this particular defendant. "63 
Indeed, W einrib' s theoretical description of modem negligence law contains much 
more than ~'a shadow or flickering of the good,"64 according to Goldberg. Weinrib 
beamed with Newtonian exuberance6s about the internal dynamics of negligence 
law: 
[C]orrective justice is immanent in the most fundamental concepts 
of negligence law .. By tracing different aspects of the progression 
from the doing to the suffering of harm, these concepts coalesc_e 
into a single normative sequence and thus instantiate corrective 
justice. Throughout, negligence law treats the plaintiff and the 
defendant as correlative to each other: the significance of doing 
lies in the possibility of causing someone to suffer, and the 
significance of suffering lies in its being the consequence of 
someone else's doing. Central to the linkage of plaintiff and 
defendant is the idea of risk, for "risk imports relation." The 
sequence starts with the potential for hann inherent in the 
defendant's wrongful act (hence-the standard ofreasonable care) 
and concludes with the realization of that potential in the 
plaintiffs injury (hence the role- of misfeasance and factual 
causation). The concepts of duty of care and proximate cause link 
the- defendant's action to the plaintiffs suffering through 
judgments about the generality of the description of the action's 
potential consequences. Each of the negligence concepts traces 
an actual or potential connection between doing and suffering, 
and together they translate into juridical terms the-movement of 
effects from the doer to the sufferer. In this way the negligence 
60. Goldberg, supra note_ 1, at 1517. · 
61. /d. 
62. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text. 
63. WEINRIB,supra note 43, at 170; see also id. at 63-66 (discussing the bipolarity of corrective 
negligence law). 
64. Goldberg, supra note I, at 1 S 17. 
65. See generally JAMES GLEICK, ISAAC NEWTON (2003) (examining the life and unpublished 
writings of Sir Isaac Newton, British scientist and philosopher who devoted his life to the study of 
physics, optics, and calculus and whose work, most prominently his three laws of motion, 
revolutionized scientific thought in the seventeenth century). 
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concepts form an ensemble that brackets and articulates a single 
normative sequence.66 
Weinrib criticized some aspects of modem strict liability tort doctrine.67 But 
Weinrib concluded with a lover's lament that "the theoretical case for basing tort 
liability on the causation ofhann without fault is inconsistent with the equality and 
correlativity of corrective justice and with the concept of agency that underlies 
Kantian right."68 Moreover, Weinrib thought it a good thing that four tort doctrines 
associated with strict liability "do not exemplify liability on causation alone. "69 
Indeed, "[1] [r]espondant superior and [2] liability for abnormal~ dangerous 
activities can be understood as extending the operation of fault," while "[3] 
nuisance law and [ 4] the incomplete privilege regarding the preservation of prope!JX 
embody corrective justice in the relationship of one property owner to another." 1 
ill. A ROBUST AESTHETICS OF MODERN AMERICAN TORT LAW 
A. Pierre Schlag's Aesthetics of American Law 
Professor Pierre Schlag made an apt observation in his landmark 2002 article, 
The Aesthetics of American Law12: "Law is an aesthetic enterprise. Before the 
ethical dreams and political ambitions of law can even be articulated, let alone 
realized, the aesthetics of law have already shaped the medium within which those 
projects will have to do their work."13 Schlag broke new ground ·in his article by 
arguing for what might be called a robust aesthetics of American law. Moving 
beyond what he characterized as "a conventional understanding of aesthetics as the 
province of beauty and fme art,"74 leading to "a moral idealization of aesthetics or 
a romanticization of law (or both),"75 Schlag based his project on articulating a 
"description of those recurrent forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and 
identity of the law."76 
Professor Schlag's aesthetically robust descriptive scheme of American law 
clarifies the multiple (and often unruly) dimensions of modern American tort law 
and encourages better appreciation of Ernest Weinrib's more limited, traditional 
aesthetic of tort law.77 From this enhanced comprehension, perhaps, some scholars 
66. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 168-69 (footnote omitted) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)). 
67. See id. at 171-203. 
68. /d. at 203. 
69. !d. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
72. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (2002). 
73. /d. at 1049. 
74. /d. at 1050. 
75. /d. at I OS 1. 
76. /d. 
77. See supra notes 40-71 and accompanying text. Indeed, Weinrib 's conception of tort law as 
a non-functional body of law resetnbles the art theory doctrine of aestheticism, which postulates "that 
art should be valued for itself alone and not for any purpose or function it may happen to serve"; thus, 
this "idea of art for art's sake is associated with a cult of beauty, which had its roots in K.antian 
aesthetics and the Romantic movetnent, although its potential application is wider than that." A 
COMPANION TO AESTHETICS 6 (David Cooper ed., 1992). 
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and lawyers can as discussed below actually come to love modem American tort 
law with its many (functional and non-functional) layers of complexity.78 
Schlag provided, a four-part aesthetic of American law: (1) a grid aesthetic, (2 
Before describing these four aesthetics in the context of American tort law, this 
Article will set forth Professor Schlag's general theories abo·ut them. First, the grid 
aesthetic pictures law as follows: 
[The grid is a] two-dimensional area divided into contiguous, 
well-bounded legal spaces. These spaces are divided into 
doctrines, rules, and the like. Those doctrines, rules, and the like 
are further divided into elements, and so on and so forth. The 
subjects, doctrines, elements, and the like are cast as "object-
forms." They exhibit the characteristic features of objects: 
boundedness, ftxity, and substantiality. They have insides and 
outsides that are separated by well-marked boundaries. The 
resulting structure· -the grid feels solid, sound, determinate. 
Law is etched in stone. The grid aesthetic is the aesthetic of 
bright-line rules, absolutist approaches, and categorical 
defmitions. 80 
Second, in the Schlagian energy aesthetic, "law is cast in the image of energy. 
Conflicting forces of principle, policy, values, and politics collide and combine in 
sundryways."81 Moreover; "[p ]recedents expand or contract in accordance with the 
push and pull of policy and principle. Legal rules, principles~ policies, and values 
have magnitudes that must be quantified, measured, and compared. Movement and 
flux are the orders of the day ."82 Third, with the perspectivist aesthetic Schlag 
theorized the following: 
the identities of law and laws mutate in relation to point of view. 
As the frame, context, perspective, or position of the actor or 
observer shifts, both fact and law come to have different identities. 
Accordingly, the social or political identity of the legal actor or 
observer becomes the crucial situs of law and legal inquiry. 83 
Finally; according to Schlag, the dissociative aesthetic plays the role of trickster in 
law: 
[As] identities collapse into each other. Nothing is what it is, but 
is always already something else. Any attempt to refer to X is 
frustrated, as even the most minimal inquiry reveals that X is an 
unstable glonuning-on of many other things that cannot be 
subsumed or stabilized within any one thing. The crucial 
contributions of the prior aesthetics the grid (and its ftxed 
identities), energy (and its quantifiable magnitudes), and 
78. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
79. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1 051 ~52. 
80. /d. at 1051. 
81. /d. 
82. /d. at 1051-52. 
83. /d. at 1 052. 
• 
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perspective (and its identifiable relations)-have all collapsed. 
No deterntinable identities, relations, or perspectives survive. 84 
Professor Schlag's theory of a robust aesthetics of American law provides an 
exciting sprin~board for a rreliminary sketch (or painting) of the aesthetics of 
modem Amencan tort law.8 · 
B. Tort Law Aesthetics 
1. Grid Aesthetics 
Modem tort law has three key axes: intentional torts, negligent torts, and strict 
liability torts. Interspersed along these three axes are an assortinent of specific torts, 
including battery, false imprisonment, and conversion (plotted off the intentional 
axis); common law negligence, statutorily-rooted negligence per se, and medical 
malpractice (extended off the negligence axis); and defective products liability, 
abnormally dangerous activity liability, and respondeat superior (charted off the 
strict liability axis). 
Imagine this plotting experiment as taking place on reticulated graph paper (the 
kind of paper one might have used in a high school geometry class). Each of the 
discrete torts (for example, battery from the intentional tort axis) can be represented 
as a rather large rectangular figure made of many smaller rectangles on the graph 
paper, although the area of each rectangle will vary depending upon the relative 
complexity of each substantive tort and its subsumed doctrines and principles. 
Imagine taking out a. box of crayons and boldly outlining each tort rectangle with 
a distinct color. Consider the following thought experiment If battery were a 
color, for example, it would. be cardinal red. As explained by Victoria Finlay in her 
wonderful book Color: A Natural History of The Palette:86 "In our modem 
language ~f. metaphors, red is an~~r, it is frre1 it is the sto~y feelings of the heart, ... It IS the god of war, and tt ts power."8 Assault, while close to battery's 
emotive sensibility, would be tropical fish orange, a color more attuned to the 
mental feature of a potential harmful or offensive touching, the apprehension of 
blows yet-to-come. "Orange is a warning color dangerous parts .of machinery are 
deliberately painted with it, the theory being that it is the most eye-catching color 
84. !d. Schlag asserted that, while these four aesthetics of American law are not "exhaustive of 
the aesthetics that can be discerned in American law,, they are, in his opinion, "the most important." 
Schlag, supra note 72, at 1052 n.l3 . 
85. Schlag pr-Ovided a rich description of his aesthetics project for American law. See id. at 
I 052-54. One of his more important general insights is as follows: 
These aesthetics are "legal," not in the sense that they are exclusive to law (they 
are not). Rather, they are legal in the sense that they are instanced in the 
traditional legal materials, the usual canonical texts, sites, and scenes of law: 
appellate opinions, rules, doctrines, and the like. They are integrated aesthetics 
in the weak sense that each is a prototypical coalescence of: 
Images and schemas, 
Rhetorical forms, 
Metaphors and other tropes, 
Perceptual modes and sensibilities, 
Dramatic tensions, 
Sensory impressions, and 
Emotions and feelings. 
/d. at 1052-53 {footnotes omitted). 
86. VICTORIA FINLAY, COLOR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE PAl .ETIE (2002). 
87. !d. at 142. 
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and people will see it and jump out of the way."88 Ochre (iron oxide) would border 
the rectangle of trespass to land and perhaps the rectangle of its close relation 
trespass to chattels because these torts are among the oldest and most familiar, and 
they bespeak a Paleolithic connection with the earth and objects made from the 
earth. Indeed, these torts resonate with the ancient vintage color of ochre, which 
was "the first color paint."89 Finlay explained this color's importance: 
[Ochre] has been used on every inhabited continent since painting 
began, and it has been around ever since, on the palettes of almost 
every artist in history. In classical times the best of it came from 
the Black Sea city of Sinope, in the area that is now Turkey, and 
was so valuable that the paint was stamped with a special 
seal . . . . The ftrSt white settlers in North America called the 
indigenous people "Red Indians" because of the way they painted 
themselves with ochre (as a shield against evil, symbolizing the 
good elements of the world, or as protection against the cold in 
winter and insects in sumn1er), while in Swaziland's Bomvu 
Ridge ... archaeologists have discovered mines that were used at 
least forty thousand years ago to excavate red and yellow 
pigments for body painting. The word "ochre" comes from the 
Greek meaning "pale yellow," but somewhere along the way the 
word shifted to suggest something more robust something 
redder or browner or earthier. Now it can be used loosely to refer 
to almost any natural earthy pigment, although it most accurate~ 
describes earth that contains a measure of hematite, or iron ore. 
The common law tort of negligence a largely nineteenth century invention 
that has evolved into a law and economics utilitarian, risk-balancing 
calculus91 would be sky blue, the color of clarity and cool calculation.92 The 
perimeter of the adjacent rectangle on the graph paper symbolizing the statutorily-
inspired tort of negligence per se would be colored cobalt blue (a more directive and 
insistent hue than sky blue).93 
In the various strict liability tort boxes on our grid-chart, the vicarious-based 
tort of respondeat superior would be charcoal black because black is a derivative 
color from the absorption of other colors.94 By way of contrast, a yellow border 
88. !d. at 195. 
89. !d. at 26. 
90. !d. at 26-27 (endnotes omitted). 
91. For an early case applying the reasonable person standard of negligence law, see Vaughan 
v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). The classic negligence law risk-balancing test was crafted 
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
92. See FINLAY, supra note 86, at 304 (describing how John Tyndall, nineteenth century British 
scientist, stated that he thought best while walking in the mountains, enjoying the clarity of the sky). 
93. Finlay described origins of cobalt: 
[C]obalt had been used in paint for years, but in its purer forrn it didn't reach 
European paint boxes until the nineteenth century, when a scientist called Louis-
Jacques Thenard managed to make it into a pigment. Ifhe had been living today, 
Michelangelo would have liked this blue best. It is expensive, and leans toward 
violet. It was the Persians who really first found how good cobalt was a 
glaze they used it for the blue tiles of their mosques .... 
!d. at 296-97. The Ming-era Chinese "coveted" cobalt and used it as a glaze on exquisitely refined 
pottery. /d. at 297. 
94. /d. at 71. 
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would surround the tort of abnonnally dangerous activity liability because of the 
ambiguity of the balancing factors used in determining ~hether an activity is 
abnormally dangerous95 and the resemblance of some of these factors to negligence-
like risk-utility analysis.96 Like the tort of strict liability for abnonnally dangerous 
activity, of all the colors, "'yellow gives some of the most mixed messages of alt"97 
Thus, yellow 
is the color of pulsating life of com and gold and angelic 
haloes and it is also at the same time a color of bile, and in its 
sulphurous incarnation it is the color of the Devil. In animal life, 
yellow especially mixed with black is a warning. Don't come 
near, it conunands, or you will be stung or poisoned or generally 
inconvenienced. In Asia yellow is the color of power ., .... the 
emperors of China were the only ones allowed to sport sunshine-
colored robes. But it is also the color of declining power. A 
sallow complexion comes with sickness; the yellow of leaves in 
autumn not only symbolizes their death, it indicates it. The 
change shows that the leaves are not absorbing the s.ame light 
energy that they used to take in when they were ,green and full of 
chloronhyll. It shows they no longer have what it takes to nourish 
them.9~ 
In considering the more specific doctrines, rules, tests, and even the more 
specific elements associated with each discrete tort,99 it would be interesting to 
attempt to imitate the artistic enterprise of artists like Piet Mondrian. Consider the 
common law tort of negligence, for example. To refme and subdivide the sky blue 
rectangle symbolizing the tort, 100 the "experimenter" might aesthetically depict the 
characteristics of negligent conduct on the grid of tort law by assorted re.ctangles 
within rectangles, each with differing shapes and areas. In this regard, first of all, 
an image of Mondrian's 1942 canvas entitled New York City I comes to mind: a 
painting of "primary colors yellow, but also red and blue [that] traverse the 
square canvas, interweaving with each other."101 Mondrian's numerous, different-
95. ~ee REST~ TEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 519-20 ( 1977) (utilizing terms such as "common 
usage," "tnappropnateness," and "value"). 
96. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 292-93 (1965) (outlining factors thetrieroffact 
should consider in detennining the utility and the risk of an actor's conduct). 
97. FINLAY, supra note ,86, at 203. 
98. /d. 
99. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
10 l. HANS L.C. JAFFE, PIET MONDRIAN 122-23 (1985) [hereinafter MONDRIAN]. See Figure 1 
below. · 
Figure 1: Piet Mondrian's 
New YQrk City I 
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sized and shaped rectangles-within-rectangles vividly convey the structure of the 
assorted characteristics of negligent conduct within the common law tort of 
negligence, even though Mondrian's primary color scheme in this work might not 
accurately depict the emotive force of the specific characteristics of the common 
law tort of negligence.102 Thus, for instance, the objective test of a defendant's 
conduct in a connnon law negligence action whether the defendant's conduct 
confonned to the conduct of a hypothetical "reasonable man''103· ... --is nicely depicted 
in Mondrian's New York City I by one of the larger rectangles running around the 
perimeter of his canvas; the objective test is an important concept and serves to 
explain many of the more specific_ aspects of the corrunon law tort of negligence 
which smaller rectangles within those larger rectangles might represent. The 
aspects might include, for example, the knowledge, experience, and perception 
which a reasonably prudent person would have perceived under the circumstances 
as well as those things which a reasonable person knows about the community.104 
Take a second example: the tort of battery. A second grid~aesthetic example 
seems appropriate: Mondrian' s more basic 1936 canvas, Composition With Red and 
Black, consisting of''an enclosed square" that is "further subdivided and enlivened 
by" horizontal lines; the "squares are brought together into larger units or, if you 
will, in which larger squares are divided up into [a few] smaller units."105 Again, 
putting aside Mondrian's specific palette choices in this painting (which we might 
want to modify to show the emotive force of specific characteristics of this 
intentional tort),106 Mondrian's minimalist, subdivided rectangles convey the 
structure of the spare elements and the associated doctrines of the tort ofbattery: the 
two manifestations of intent, which include a defendant's desire to cause a hannful 
or offensive contact with the plaintiff or the plaintiffs apprehension of imminent 
contact, or defendant's knowledge that the consequences are substantially certain 
to result from defendant's conduct;107 the concept of the plaintiffs -"person" 
including those things in contact with it or closely connected and identified with 
it; 10·8 the rule that the plaintiff need not be aware of the defendant's contact at the 
102. See supra notes 86--98 and accompanying text. 
103. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 283 (1965). 
1 04~ !d. §§ 289~90. . . 
105. MONDRIAN,supra note 101, at 116-17. See Figure 2, below. 
Figure 2: Piet Mandrian's 
Composition with Red and 
Black 
106~ See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
107. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§SA, 13, 14, 16, 18,20 (1965). 
108 . ld. § 18 cmt. c. 
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time;109 the definition of harmful contact110 and the more expansive definition of 
offensive contact;111 and various privileges, or defenses, to battery such as 
consent, 112 self-defense, 113 defense of others, 114 and the like. 
For more esoteric torts like negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
defamation, and invasion of privacy, for example the rectilinear limitations of the 
grid aesthetic in conveying the complexity and nuances of assorted doctrines and 
definitions and rules tempts consideration of artists like Vasily Kandinsky (in 
particular his final, "biomorphic" phase). 115 Indeed, Kandinsky' s 1936 Composition 
IX, with its "superimposed planes" and "hard-edged, diagonal stripes" and "floating 
rectangles, squares, and several circles at both ends/'116 captures the multiple 
dimensions of these three complex torts.117 Thus, utilizing complex imagery like 
109. !d. § 18 cmt. d. 
110. I d. § 15. Hannful contact is actionable if it produces bodily hann. This includes any physical 
damage, however slight, to any part of the plaintiffs body (sqch as a cut or a bruise) or even so-called 
"beneficial'' contacts (like plastic surgery). !d. § 15 cmt. a. 
111. Jd. § 19. An offensive contact is one which "offends a reasonable sense of personal 
dignity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF.TORTS § 19 (1965). 
112-. See id. §§ 49-62,167-75, 252-56; RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 892, 89ZA-892D 
(1979). 
113. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 63-68,261 (1965). 
114. See id. §§ 76, 156. 
115. See THOMAS M. MESSER, VASILY KANDINSKY (James Leggio ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
KANDINSKY]. According to Messer, Kandinsk:y's art is characterized by three distinct phases: 
In this first phase, with its ever more intense expressivity, the emerging 
distinction between a kind of painting that has gradually stripped itself of mimetic 
vestiges and one that has embraced, from the outset, a non-objective mode, 
becomes incre~singly significant. In Kandinsky' s subsequent development, 
roughly from the early 1920s to the early 1930s the figurative element was 
virtually excluded, and pictorial content was conveyed through quasi-geometic 
means. The expressive component of painting was reduced in favor of rational 
construction. The artist's final major phase, in the last ten years of his life, 
revealed a painter largely freed from dogmatic prescriptions and capable therefore 
of responding to fresh stimuli. He found inspiration for a new kind ofbiomorphic 
form that allowed him to strike a balance between the objective and the non-
objective, the expressive and the rational. 
/d. at 8-10 (emphasis added). 
116. /d. at 118._19. See Figure 3 below. 
117. First; the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has special rules for bystanders 
and direct victims, with various proximate cause limitations to limit emotional distress recovery. See 
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 905 (1979); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§§ 306,312,313, 
436, 436A, 456 (1965). Second, the tort of defamation is characterized by multiple rules for what is 
defamatory, the degree of fault a plaintiff~ust show on the part of the defendant in knowing or failing 
to ascertain the falsity of a statement, and the need for proof of special damages for some defamatory 
statements versus special damages rules being "actionable per se" for other defamatory statements. See 
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORJ'S §§ 558--623 (1977). Third, thetortofinvasionofprivacy, as it has 
developed in the caselaw to date, involves separate rules and doctrines for four distinct wrongs: (1) 
appropriation of one's name or likeness; (2) intrusion upon another's privacy or private affairs; (3) 
public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff and (4) placing the plaintiff in a false light in the 
public eye. See id. §§ 652A-652E. 
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paintings by Mondrian and Kandinsky might enable the experimenter to portray the 
linear dimensions of tort law on the grid. But the complexities of modem tort law 
yield vital insight by shifting the experiment to the energy aesthetic. 
2. Energy Aesthetics 
Modem tort law is also characterized by constantly shifting forces of policy, 
values, and principles that coalesce and then recombine in endless ways. The 
numerous policies that press and pull on tort doctrine, rules, and outcomes bracingly 
illustrate the multiple force fields of tort law. One current torts casebook, 118 for 
example, articulates a dozen separate policies for modem tort law: 
• 
/d. 
/d. 
1. "Liability should be based on 'fault.'" 119 
2. "Liability should be proportional to fault." 120 
3. "Liability should be used to deter accidents."121 
4. "The costs of accidents should be spread broadly."122 
118. VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (2d ed. 1999). 
119. /d. at 7. 
The fault principle has been strongly influential for more than a century, and it 
accounts for much of the Jaw of negligence, and other tort rules as well. In part, 
it is intended to allow individuals a maximum sphere of action free of the risk of 
tort liability. According to the fault principle, only where the defendant's conduct 
is blameworthy should liability be imposed. In general, the term "fault" is used 
in torts to encompass situations where hann is the product of intentionally 
tortious conduct or failure to exercise care. 
120. /d. 
The proportionality principle seeks to limit or refine application of the fault 
principle. In part, it holds that liability should not be levied on an individual 
tortfeasor, even if fault is shown, if doing so would expose the defendant to a 
burden that is disproportionately heavy or perhaps unlimited. In addition, the 
principle of proportionality holds that where the tortious conduct of two or more 
persons contributes to the production of hann, liability for the loss should be 
allocated among the actors in accordance with the degree to which their conduct 
has precipitated the damage. 
121. /d. 
The detert ence principle recognizes that tort law is concerned not only with fairly 
allocating past losses, but also with minimizing the costs of future accidents. 
According to this principle, tort rules should discourage persons from engaging 
in those forms of conduct which pose an excessive risk of personal injury or 
property damage. In some cases, this means nothing more than that liability 
should be imposed on those who deliberately inflict injury or cause hattn by 
ignoring foreseeable risks. In other situations, such as those where a risk ofharm 
is equally foreseeable to more than one person, the policy of deterrence favors 
placing the threat of liability on the party best situated to avoid the loss, or, as 
some might say, the cheapest cost a voider. 
JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 118, at 7. 
122. Id. 
The idea underlying the "spreading" rationale is that the financial burden of 
accidents may be diminished by spreading losses broadly so that no person is 
forced to bear a large share of the damages. For example, some argue that when 
a defective product unforeseeably causes injury to a consumer, it is best to place 
the loss on the manufacturer, even in the absence of fault, for unlike the 
unfortunate consumer, the manufacturer can distribute the loss to a large segment 
of the public by incrementally adjusting the price of its products. Losses can be 
spread not only through increases in the costs of goods and services, but through 
other devices such as taxation and insurance. Though controversial, the spreading 
498 
!d. 
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- S. "The costs of accidents should be shifted to those best able to 
bear them."123 
6. "Those who benefit from dangerous activities should bear 
resulting losses."124 
7. "Tort law should foster predictability in human affairs."125 
8. "Tort law should facilitate economic growth and the pursuit 
of progress.u126 
9. "Tort law should be administratively convenient and efficient, 
and should avoid intractable inquiries."127 
10. "Tort law should discourage the waste ofresources."128 
11. "Courts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of 
govellUllent." 129 
12. "Accident victims should be fully compensated."130 
principle, in recent years, has revolutionized the law of products liability and has 
catalyzed other changes in tort doctrine. 
123. /d. 
Although this principle is not concerned with identifying which persons are in a 
good position to spread liability, the "shifting" rationale is closely related to the 
spreading principle insofar as it seeks to use the process of loss allocation to 
minimize the economic burden of accidents. According to this view, a loss will 
be less severely felt if it is placed on one with substantial resources than on one 
with limited wealth, and therefore losses should be shifted to those financially 
able to bear them. Proponents of this view argue, for example, that it is 
undesirable to force an accident victim with only $100 in assets to bear the full 
amount of a $100 loss, for doing so means than [sic] the accident will have a 
devastating financial impact. In contrast, shifting the same loss to a defendant 
with a million dollars in assets may be desirable, for then the loss will not really 
be felt by either the plaintiff or the defendant. To be sure, the law has never held 
that a poor person should always be able to recover from a_ rich one, or that a 
wealthy person is precluded from seeking damages from one financially less well 
to do. Indeed, in many quarters, there is great reluctance to applying one l~w to 
the rich ·and another to the poor. Yet, the shifting rationale- sometimes 
pejoratively referred to as the search for the "deep pockets, has not been 
without influence. However, its impact on tort doctrine has been less overt than 
the impact of many other policy considerations. 
Id. at 7-8. 
!d. 
124. Id. at 8. 
125. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 118, at 8. 
126. /d. 
127. /d. 
Only a limited amountofresources can be devoted to the administration ofjustice 
in any society. This principle holds that tort rules should be shaped so that the 
dollars spent on accident compensation are efficiently employed. Thus, legal 
standards should not be so complex or uncertain that their application entails an 
undue expenditure of judicial resources or imposes unnecessarily high litigation 
costs on parties. So, too, convenience and efficiency discourage the pursuit of 
what might be called intractable inquiries, matters where the facts are such that 
even after expenditure of considerable time and money, there is a substantial risk 
that an erroneous result will be reached. 
128. /d. 
129. /d. 
130. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 118, at 8. 
There is a strong public interest in insuring that accident victims obtain the 
financial resources needed to overcome the injuries they have sustained. 
Proponents of this view argue that tort rules should be crafted and applied with 
an eye toward this goal, even if that means diminished respect for the fault or 
proportionality principles or other tort policies. A corollary to the compensation 
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The push and pull of these tort policies are "sometimes antagonistic."131 By 
way of illustration, "[a]dherence to the fault principle may mean that an actor will 
not be held liable for an unforeseeable injury, but also that the victim of that 
accident will not be compensated."132 But this is not always the case: 
[I]t is often possible for a decision on issues of accident 
compensation to advance more than one tort goal. For example, 
a court may hold that a driver who causes an auto accident by 
exceeding the prescribed speed limit is liable to an injured 
pedestrian for all resulting damages. In that case, it may be said 
that the decision bases liability on fault (because the conduct was 
unreasonable and the harm was foreseeable), deters future 
accidents by this driver or others (by showing that violators will 
be held liable), fully compensates the victim (by imposing liability 
for resulting damages), embraces a predictable standard (namely 
the posted speed limit), and defers to the legislature's judgment as 
to the maximum reasonable speed on the road (by holding that 
violation of the speed limit constitutes actionable negligence). 133 
These competing and sometimes complementary policies of modem tort law 
bring to mind orreries the clockwork, astronomical apparatuses of eighteenth 
century natural philosophers. These orreries depicted the various planets of our 
solar system, along with their various moons, moving in ftxed orbits that 
occasionally align with other planets!34 In a related way, modem tort law's 
seemingly chaotic policies may be better envisioned as akin to the free-form 
sculptural works created by Alexander Calder, which came to be labeled "mobiles'' 
by fellow artist Marcel Duchamp.135 Calder's 1956 mobile, Red Lily Pads, owned 
by the Guggenheim museums; is apropos in representing the potential multifarious 
juxtapositions and energy tensions among various tort policies in influencing 
jurisprudential outcomes and in shaping doctrine, rules, and principles. 136 Reading 
the following description of Calder's mobile sculptures encourages better 
appreciation of those policies of modem tort law, such as the fault, deterrence, or 
full compensation principles137 which, like Calder's art, can be experienced as 
"anthropomorphic metaphorS": 
/d. 
principle is the argument that a system which awards compensation on a regular, 
predictable, and consistent basis is preferable to one in which doctrinal and 
administrative vicissitudes render the availability of compensation a matter of 
chance. 
131. ld. 
132. ld. 
133. ld. 
134. See generally I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN TilE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKUN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 80-86 (1995) (describing 
various orreries admired by Thomas Jefferson, and explaining that the first orreries were constructed 
in London in 1713 and showed only the motions of the Earth and Moon, but by mid-century orreries 
displayed the orbital motions of planets and their satellites). 
135. GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM: A TO Z 59 (Nancy Spector ed., 1992) [hereinafter GUGGENHEIM 
COLLECTION]. 
136. See id. at 58-59. 
137. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. 
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[The mobile] is now a vernacular art fottn, but when Calder 
invented it the mobile was viewed as an avante-garde 
achievement, a sculptural counterpart to Joan Mir6's paintings of 
buoyant, biomorphic figures and Jean Arp's abstract reliefs. 
Although they are nonfigurative, Calder's hanging mobiles, 
particularly the monumental yet delicate Red Lily Pads, retain 
references to the natural world: the dancing and spinning of the 
disks evoke the intangible qualities of the air that propels them. 
According to art historian Rosalind Krauss, the mobiles as 
interconnected vertical structures in space create a sense of 
volume analogous to that of the human body. In their surrender 
to the pull of gravity and their displacement of space through 
motion, the mobiles become anthropomorphic metaphors.138 
Alternatively, meditation on Brancusi's wooden sculptures (such as Adam and 
Eve, The Sorceress, and King of Kings), the dynamic interaction of various shaped 
spheres, hollowed-out cubes, blocks, and curvilinear forms spark recognition of the 
charged energy field of modem tort policies. 139 
The grid aesthetic and the energy aesthetic140 can deepen understanding of the 
structure of modem tort law and the interacting forces affecting modem tort law. 
But a transition to the perspectivist aesthetic is necessary to put human faces on 
modem tort disputes. 
3. Perspectivist Aesthetics 
What are the various ftmnes of reference, contexts, or perspectives of the actors 
or observers in tort cases? What are their social identities? Their political 
identities? The perspectivist aesthetic allows commentators to move from 
consideration of tort grids and tort energies to consider what one recent book refers 
to as "torts stories":141 
Behind each notable case are a host of concerns and 
considerations that are hidden even from the discerning eye, 
focused as it is on the court's selective recitation of the facts and 
its characterization of the issues and arguments presented to it. 
Often, much more can be learned from digging beneath the 
surface to find out more about the parties, the events giving rise 
to the claimed injury, and the corresponding context of socio-
economic circumstances in which the case arose. And then the 
lawyers enter the picture. How did they perceive and present the 
case what were their lawyering strategies and ho~ did they 
shape the way the case ultimately turned out? So, too, what of 
roles played by the trial judge, and in some instances, an 
intermediate appellate court? 
138. GUGGENHEIMCOJ.I.ECTION,supra note 135, at 58. 
139. See id. 52-53. Interestingly, Brancusci intended his abstract wooden sculptures to be a 
"poetic evocation of spiritual thought." /d. at 52. Cf Robert F. Blomquist, Law and Spirituality: Some 
First Thoughts on an Emerging Relation, 11 UMKCL. REv. 583 (2003) (encouraging the etnergence 
of Jaw and spirituality as a new interdisciplinary field of scholarship). 
140. See supra notes 86-139 and accompanying text. 
141. See TORTS STORIES (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
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As these lines of inquiry are meant to suggest, every tort case 
begins with a particular misadventure of its own, and runs the 
course of a system in which distinct contributions are made by a 
variety of participants along the way to final resolution. To view 
these elements in fine detail is to understand the dynamic 
character of tort law indeed, the dynamic character of the 
common law, more generally in a fashion that by its very nature 
cannot be fully conveyed in an appellate judicial opinion. 142 
501 
Going beyond the published appellate opinions in tort cases to examine and 
appreciate the economic situation of a tort plaintiff, like part-time janitor and part-
time cleaning wotnan Helen Palsgraf in the famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad Co., 143 clarifies the role of economic class in early twentieth century 
America, and the insensitivities of the upper-middle-class judges to serious injuries 
and inability to earn a living. 144 
Ascertaining the character of a tort plaintiff demonstrates the risks that good 
samaritans often face in the real world. Take, for example, Donald MacPherson, 
plaintiff in the celebrated case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 145 who was on 
"a mission of mercy" to transport his friend to a far-off hospital for hand surgery 
when one of the wheels of his automobile collapsed. 146 Then consider the 
seemingly all-American Iowa farm couple Mr. and Mrs. Edward Briney in Katko 
v. Briney,141 forced to pay considerable compensatory and punitive damages to the 
thief Marvin Katko, who was severely injured by a 20-gauge spring shotgun, set 
earlier by the Brineys, when he broke into their vacant farm house near Oskaloosa, 
Iowa. 148 Fathotning the full, gritty, oppressive magnitude of the legal consequences 
visited upon them enables society to sympathize with the hapless suffering of well-
intentioned, but imperfect, property owners, while also feeling the pain of a 
common thief who, nevertheless, deserved a tort remedy for injuries received from 
protective measures taken by property owners out of all proportion to decency and 
good sense.149 
142. Id. at 1. 
143. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
144. See Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Introduction to TORTS STORlES 2-8 (Robert 
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MAsKS 
OF THE LAW I 11-51 (1976) (noting Cardozo's disturbingly concise statementofthe facts inPalsgraf, 
shedding no light upon the individual players in the case and the ensuing disappearance of the 
personalities behind the shadow of emerging tort theory); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY 
IN REPUTATION 33-48 (1990) (discussing Palsgrafs celebrity, due in part to Cardozo's economical 
statement of the facts, which omits all extraneous details of Mrs. Palsgrar s background). 
145. Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
146. James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company: Simplifying the Facts 
While Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES, supra note 141, at 41-43. 
147. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). 
148. /d. at 658-59 (Larson, J., dissenting). 
149. The Iowa Supreme Court affinned Katko'sjury verdict of$20,000 in actual damages and 
$10,000 in punitive damages. /d. at 658, 662. The rest of the story is fascinating and painful to 
contemplate. "Katko pled guilty to petty larceny and received a 30-day suspended sentence and a $50 
fine," JOHN W. WADE ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 109 (9th ed. 1994), for breaking and 
entering the Briney's vacant property with intent to steal old bottles and fruit jars which he thought 
were antiques. Katko, 183 N.W.2d at 658. "The Brineys bad to sell SO acres of their 120-acre fann 
in order to pay the judgment in this case." WADE ET AL., supra, at 109. Moreover, "(a] strange 
development later arose between the parties:" 
When the 80 acres were put up for judgment sale and there were no bids above 
the minimum price of$1 0,000, three neighbors borrowed money to purchase the 
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Looking at a case from the standpoint of race, ethnicity, or gender 
considerations afford some illuminating insights. Take for example, Mary O'Brien, 
the Irish immigrant wotnan who sued a steamship line for battery because the ship 
surgeon gave 0 'Brien a vaccination before she came ashore to her new home in the 
United States.150 In 0 'Brien v. Cunard, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts affrmted the directed verdict in favor of the Cunard Steam-Ship 
Company based on the privilege of apparent consent. 151 But why did the American 
courts dispense such harsh judgment on a female Irish immigrant?152 From her 
perspective, Ms. O'Brien likely felt intimidated and powerless to speak up, as the 
other 200 immigrant passengers no doubt felt. Was the judiciary correct to assume 
that Ms. O'Brien was literate and could read the various "notices" of the quarantine 
regulations about the need to obtain a vaccination?153 
The perspectives of lawyers in a tort case such as the W obum, Massachusetts 
groundwater contamination toxic tort case, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 154 reflect the 
different versions of reality involved in that dispute. 155 From the perspective of the 
plaintiffs' lawyer, Jan Schlichtmann, the litigation process which resulted in a 
bifurcated trial with the groundwater contamination causation tried frrst led to 
a lengthy, expensive, and unjust result. 156 From the perspective of the defendant 
W .. R. Grace & Co.'s lawyer, William Cheeseman, the way the case unfolded 
supported his client's view that "no credible scientific evidence [existed] that the 
land for a dollar more, expecting to hold it for the Brineys until they won their 
appeaL When they did not win, the neighbors leased the land back to them for 
enough to pay taxes and interest costs on the money the neighbors had borrowed. 
Several years later when land values rose, the neighbors offered to sell it back to 
[the] Brineys at a price they could not afford. One of the neighbors then bought 
the property from the others for $16,000 and sold it to his son for $16,500. [The] 
Briney[ s] and Katko, to whom the Brineys still owed money from the judgment, 
then sued the neighbors, arguing that the land was being held in trust for the 
Brineys and that they were entitled to the profit from the increase in value. Just 
before the case came to trial, it was settled for a sum large enough to pay the 
remainder of [the] Brineys' judgment to Katko. 
/d. "A public outcry about the decision resulted in the introduction of 'Briney Bills' in several state 
legislatures." /d. 
150. O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891). 
151. /d. at 266-67. 
152. See generally Ann C. Shalleck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of 0 'Brien v. 
Cunard, 51 Mo. L. REv. 371 (1992) (oneofmanyarticles in a symposium edition on the O'Brien case). 
153. /d. at 375-77. 
154. 862 F.2d 910 (lst Cir. 1988), aff'g 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983). 
155. See generally LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DocUMENTARY COMPANION 
TO A CIVIL ACTION (rev. ed. 2002) (compilation of documents from the Anderson v. Cryovac case, with 
introductory writings by the primary lawyers for each of the parties involved). 
156. Schlichtmann expressed his perspective as follows: 
l suggest one way to judge the Rules and their application in the Woburn 
case is by reference to the first rule: Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action." Judged by this yardstick, how 
did the application of the Civil Rules to the Woburn case measure up? Can nine 
years of litigation be called "speedy''? Can litigation that consumed tens of 
thousands of hours of work by hundreds of people at the cost of tens of millions 
[of] dollars be fairly characterized as "inexpensive''? And can the resolution be · 
tenned "just"? It was a resolution that involved a trial at which no family 
member was allowed to tell his or her story; legal judgments about the world 
which facts and the passage of time have demonstrated were clearly wrong; and 
a record that was admittedly corrupted. 
Jan Richard Schlichtmann, Introduction to LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A 
DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION, at xxvi (rev. ed. 2002). 
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Grace chemicals could have reached the municipal wells before the wells were 
taken out of service" and "no evidence [showed] that these chemicals are capable 
of causing" childhood leukemias and other physical maladies. 157 
And, from the perspective of Jerome P. Facher, lawyer for the defendant 
Beatrice Foods Company, the result of the Anderson case was appropriate because 
Beatrice Foods did not legally cause the plaintiffs' injuries and deaths. Facher 
explained his view: 
I am always surprised by those who can comfortably rush to the 
conclusion that a "deep pocket" defendant, once accused of 
wrongdoing, must or should somehow be liable for a plaintiffs 
serious personal injuries. In doing so, their conclusions whether 
motivated by sympathy, compassion or outrage ignore the legal 
necessity to prove that the defendant's conduct caused the 
plaintiffs injuries. In Anderson, the plaintiffs brought their claim 
to the civil justice system for resolution by a jury on the facts and 
the law. Their lawyers knew that, in that system, liability is based 
on fault, that fault is established by evidence, and that no loss can 
be shifted from an injured party to a defendant without frrst 
showing that the defendant's cQnduct caused that loss. It is still 
one of the basic principles of our civil justice system that no party 
should pay for losses it did not cause, no matter how serious the 
injury. In Anderson, that basic principle was reaffirmed by the 
vecy system the plaintiffs chose to decide their dispute. 158 
4. Dissociative Aesthetics 
Sometimes, those that talk about tort law have difficulty providing coherent 
fonns; sometimes, conunentators try to dissolve tort law forms. Professor Schlag 
said, "The experience of dissociation might be described as the unraveling of a 
secure identity to the point at which we really do not know what it is anymore."159 
His reasoning is as follows: 
One concept lapses into the next as the differentiations 
dissipate. In the dissociative aesthetic, the state, legal rules, 
custom, and psychological dispositions are not external to each 
other; they are already glommed onto each other. In the 
dissociative aesthetic, one comes to recognize that various 
identities to wit, law, the state, rules, custom, psychological 
disposition, and more are already so conjoined that no 
conceptual work can separate them out. The sensation here is of 
conceptual quicksand, of distinctions that dissipate -a kind of 
157. William J. Cheeseman, Introduction to LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A 
. DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION, at xiv (rev. ed. 2002). 
158. Jerome P. Facher, Introduction to LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A 
DocUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVlLACTIONlt at xxiii (rev. ed. 2002); see also Robert F. Blomquist, 
Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials, the American Legal Profossion, and Popular Perceptions of the Law, 81 
CORNELLL. REv. 953 (1996) (reviewing Jonathon Harr's A Civil Action, and specifically, the problem 
of "indeternrinate defendants,'). · 
159. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1097. 
• 
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virtual.J:risprudential reality in which identities morph into each 
other.' 
Considering Professor Goldberg's description of the scholarly displeasure with 
modern American tort law, 161 this frustration and unwillingness to love tort law is 
likely due to tort scholars being stranded in a dissociative aesthetic that sees no 
rhyme or reason, no coherence, and no utility for tort law grids, energies, and 
perspectives. Scholarly tort unlovers' understanding might be labeled a pessimistic 
dissociative aesthetic that is wedded to logic and therefore, is dismayed at the 
"hypertrophied differentiation" of modem tort law and experiences "a moment at 
which the accumulation of differentiations comes crashing down, leaving the legal 
self flailing around in intellectual mush. "162 But, this scholarly pessimistic 
dissociative aesthetic overlooks a more optimistic dissociative aesthetic that 
unleashes creativity in fotmulating and reconstructing new tort law: 
[To] appreciate the ways in which legal identities can collapse 
into a multitude of associations allows the advocate or judge to 
reconstruct those identities in desired ways. This breakdown and 
reconstruction is perhaps the most intense aesthetic moment in 
law-the point at which the legal profession is creating law.163 
An optimistic dissociative aesthetic for modem tort law, therefore, allows 
advocates, judges, and legal scholars, in extraordinary cases, to contemplate ''new 
torts": new concepts, new doctrines, new rules, and even new causes of action. 164 
In less extraordinary tort cases, an optimistic dissociative aesthetic, drawing upon 
insights from legal realism, moral theory, and critical legal studies, can empower 
advocates and judges to reformulate and reconstruct tort law doctrines, moral 
justifications, and social visions. 165 Even in ordinary tort cases, an optimistic 
dissociative aesthetic allows advocates and judges to shape the "facts," and 
therefore, the dispositive tort "law" of the dispute: 
[An optimistic dissociative aesthetic] knows that "the law" and 
"the facts" are created in light of each other. Practicing lawyers 
know that, in an important sense, "the facts" are effects of sundry 
perfonnances: recollections, statements, behaviors, affects, 
linguistic performances of clients, witnesses, experts, and more. 
They know, as well, that the law is, in an important sense, an 
amalgamation of signs, beliefs, events, linguistic expressions, 
habits, perceptions, and prejudices that the lawyer helps compose 
for the occasion: for the client, the judge, and other relative 
160. ld. (emphasis added). 
161. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text. 
162. Schlag, supra note 72, at 11 01. 
163. /d. at 1098 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
164. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, "New Torts": A Critical History, Taxonomy, and 
Appraisal, 95 DICK. L. REv. 23, 129 (1990) ("At its essence ... the term 'new tort,' as used by 
American courts and commentators over the past one hundred years, is an indication, an item of 
circumstantial evidence, that a court is being requested to or has decided to use judicial creativity to 
alter existing tort law."). 
165. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS: A 
STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW ( 1987) (exploring the evolution of tort accident law and the 
background influences of moral justifications and social vision on judicial opinions). 
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audiences. The lawyer knows that both law and facts are, in 
important ways, productions. In experiencing the fluidity of law 
and fact, the lawyer is enacting the [optimistic] dissociative 
aesthetic. It is, of course, often her job, as she writes her brief or 
her clo_sing argument, ~o re·duce this fluidi~ to the crystal clarity 
of a gnd or to the movtng force of energy. 66 
IV. LEA~JNG TO LoVE TORTS 
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Based on the insights of Professor Goldberg, legal scholars should learn to 
champion and love modem American tort law for five reasons. First, loving torts 
allows scholars to appreciate the complexity· of the facts and legal constructs that 
compromise this unruly branch of the law without conditioning our approval on any 
particular aesthetic or aesthetics.. This appreciation can allow boundaries to 
dissolve and legal activity to thrive. 167 
Second, the grid aesthetic of tort law compromising the marvelous 
cubbyholes of separately named torts along with the accompanying doctrines, 
principles~ rules is an abstract thing of beauty and some ugliness, harmony and 
some disharmony, and order and some disorder, 168 that constitutes the system of 
private law that governs social relations. 169 The grid aesthetic, on which Professor 
Weinrib focuses with majestic insight, reveals the goodness, nonnatiye force, and 
internal intelligibility of tort law's concern for non· functionalist corrective justice.170 
Such aesthetic for1n is worthy of admiration and love. 
Third, the energy aesthetic of tort law consisting of the multiple policies that 
expand, compress, or reconfigure the tort grid in interesting ways should instill 
in observers of tort law the excitement and love for the vibrating forces that pull and 
push (in the artistic physics of functional, public law) on tort categories and 
presuppositions.171 
Fourth, the perspectivist aesthetic of tort law, with its different views, diverse 
~xpe~ences, ~d multiple ~terests, shoul~ insgire fo!ldness, fancy, and devoti~n .to 
hsterung, tellmg, and re-tellmg of tort stones.' 2 Lovmg torts from the perspecttvtst 
aesthetic, however, requires both a detached and unconditional appraisal of the mix 
of tort stories and the cultivation of a taste for plaintiffs' tort stories, defendants' tort 
stories, and non-litigant institutional tort stories. 
Fifth, the dissociative aesthetic of tort law, with its incoherent fonns, 
dissolution of categories, and sense of collapse, is often jarring, disorienting, and 
frightening, but can lead legal scholars to transfonnational experiences in · . · g 
,. 
166. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1098 (footnotes omitted). "In a tough case, however, it will often 
be a better brief and a better closing argument if she has experienced the dissociative aesthetic (before 
engaging in the reduction)." /d. · 
167. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra notes 86-117 and accoDtpanying text. 
169. See supra notes 40-61 and acc<>mpanying text. 
170. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 118-40 and accompanying text; see generally Robert F. Blomquist, Goals, 
Means, _and Problems for Modern Tort Law: A Reply to Professor Priest, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 621 
(1988) (criticizing Professor George Priest's article Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. 
REv. I (1987), and its focus on a limited number of goals tort law serves in this modern, diverse 
society). 
172. See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text. 
• 
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about tort law and, in the final analysis, can coax "tough love" .and appreciation for 
the catalytic potential of legal deconstruction as a prelude to legal construction.173 
V. CONCLUSION 
In a follow-up article to his Vanderbilt Law Review essay about the "unloved" 
quality of modem tort law, 174 Professor Goldberg wrote about twentieth-century tort 
theory. 175 Interestingly, he suggests that one possible response to tort law theory is 
to "adopt a stance of congenial pluralism" because modem "[t]ort law is a 
multifaceted enterprise, so . . . each theory brings something to the table" and 
"[e]ach ... highlights factors that matter to tort law, and we should embrace them 
all. " 176 Goldberg, however, ultimately rejects ''congenial pluralism" at least for 
tort scholars, while suggesting that judges might benefit from this 
approach because, while "congenial pluralism is surely appropriate as an antidote 
to dogmatism," ultimately, "it leaves academics with_nothing more to do than to talk 
past one another." 177 Suggesting that academics "[ c ]auld ... do a little better than 
that,"178 Professor Goldberg offered a set of critical "methodological guidelines" for 
the development of twenty-frrst century tort law.179 
Perhaps, Goldberg wants to fully love tort law 'but is afraid to validate (and, 
therefore, love) each and every aspect of tort law because of concerns about 
"coherence a demand rooted in elemental notions of fairness, predictability, and 
efficacy."180 Goldberg wants tort scholars (and presumably tort students, judges, 
and legislators) to talk with one another instead of past one another; but, by 
implication, Goldberg wants to discredit and undennine (and, therefore, not fully 
love) what he views as incoherent accounts of tort law. These accounts, which 
presumably for him, would attempt to merely "explain or defend tort in tenns of 
beauty or elegance. "181 · 
Humbly, this Article suggests that learning to love torts in all its 
capaciousness and messiness is a necessary condition to creatively reforn1ulating 
'tort law for the twenty-frrst century.182 And, learning to appreciate and to validate 
the four aesthetics of modem tort law the grid, energy, perspectivist, and 
dissociative, whether they reveal beauty or elegance, ugliness or disorder, coherence 
173. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text. 
174. Goldberg, supra note 1. 
175. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 3. 
t 76. /d. at 578. 
177. /d. at 581. 
178. /d. 
179. /d. at 581-82. 
180. /d. at 580. 
181. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 3, at 580. 
182. The following describes one of the greatest literary works on love: 
Lucretius opens his poem On The Nature of Things with an invocation to Venus, 
''the life-giver" without whom nothing "comes forth into the bright coasts of 
life, nor waxes glad nor lovely." Nor is it only the poet who speaks 
metaphorically of love as the creative force which engenders things and renews 
them, or as the power which draws all things together into a unity . . . . The 
imagery of love appears even in the language of science. The descripti()n of 
magnetic attraction and repulsion borrows some of its fundamental tenns from the 
vocabulary of the passions; Gilbert, for example, refers to "the love of the iron for 
the loadstone.,_, 
1 THE GREAT IDEAS: A SYNTOPICON OF GREAT BOOKS OF lHE WESTERN WORlD 1 051 (Mortimer J. 
Adler & William Gorman eds., 1952) (Volume 2 of GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert 
Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952)). 
I 
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or incoherence is a necessary condition to loving torts. Thinking about tort law 
should be more in the nature of assembling collectibles like biscuit tins, chewing 
gum wrappers, cotnics, art deco, ink wells, napkin rings, spittoons, or Civil War 
memorabilia. Many collectibles, in their own time, were "unfamiliar, and very 
possibly unloved or misunderstood."183 But over time, many collectibles became 
cutting-edge, interesting, and loved. Before we judge it, let us truly lean1 to love 
tort law. 
183. CAROL PRISANT, ANTIQUES ROADSHOW lOTH CENTURY COI .LECTIBLES xxv (2003 ). 

